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INTERVIEW WITH JAMES BOYD WHITE
INTRODUCTION
The occasion of the following interview was the Montesquieu Lecture at
the University of Tilburg, which Professor James Boyd White delivered in
February 2006.' In the lecture, entitled "When Language Meets the Mind,"
Professor White discussed the manner of interpreting and criticizing texts,
both in the law and in other fields, that he has worked out over his career.
The heart of this method, as described in the lecture, is to direct attention
to three sets of questions:
" What is the language in which this text is written, and the culture
of which it is a part? How are we to evaluate these things?
" What relation does this writer or speaker establish with this lan-
guage as he uses it--does he just replicate it unthinkingly, or
does he make it the object of critical attention or transformation?
How are we to evaluate what he does?
* What relation does the writer or speaker establish with those to
whom and about whom he speaks? How are we to evaluate these
relations?
To ask these questions in a serious way invites one into a complex mode
of thought: thought at once anthropological and linguistic, as it examines a
culture and its language; at once literary and psychological, as it examines
ways of simultaneously employing the resources and resisting the limitations
of one's cultural inheritance; at once ethical and political, as it examines the
identities, the relations, and the communities we create and dissolve and re-
create as we speak or write. The method is both descriptive and normative,
and it treats both law and other forms of thought and speech. It underlies
Professor White's writing and teaching alike.
Jeanne Gaakeer, the interviewer (as well as a contributor to this tribute to
Professor White), has long been interested in the relation between law and
the humanities, having written her doctoral dissertation on the subject and
having published a book on law and literature, with particular attention to the
work of Professor White, entitled Hope Springs Eternal.
The work of which this lecture is an example is inherently interdiscipli-
nary, making use throughout of humanistic and literary texts to help us
understand the nature of legal thought and expression. As early as 1965, in a
review of Myron Gilmore's Humanists and Jurists, Professor White was
critical of the then prevailing lack of connection between law, history, and
literature, fields once common to the legal profession. Since then he has
sought to connect these fields in large part through their shared engagement
I. In an earlier version this interview was published in the Netherlands in The Netherlands
Journal for Legal Philosophy and Jurisprudence in 2006, and is here reprinted with permission.
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with language. This emphasis follows from Professor White's view that the
essence of the lawyer's work lies in the process:
[o]f identifying and construing authoritative texts, of translating from an-
other discourse in to the law. [T]hese are literary activities, arts .... or what
the Greeks would call technai.
All this, for Professor White, involves an "enterprise of the imagination," "an
enterprise whose actual performance is the claim of meaning against the
odds: the translation of the imagination into reality by the power of lan-
guage."
In this interview Professor White discusses a broad array of topics, vary-
ing from the possibilities and impossibilities of Law and Economics, and
Law and Literature, to legal interpretation and the interrelation of law and
politics, with the issue of Guantanamo Bay as a poignant example.
MONTESQUIEU LECTURE:
"WHEN LANGUAGE MEETS THE MIND"
For your Montesquieu lecture you used as a motto Simone Weil's "Only
he who knows the empire offorce and how not to respect it is capable of love
and justice." What was the reason that you chose this text and in what way
does it exemplify important themes for your view on law?
The essay from which this sentence is taken, L'Iliade, ou le pokme de la
force, has been in my mind ever since I first read it over forty years ago.
Weil's reading of the Iliad deeply influenced my own interpretation of that
poem in When Words Lose Their Meaning, and the larger view out of which
Weil was writing, captured in that brief sentence, has become increasingly
significant for me.
It is wonderful in many respects. For one thing it takes the position that
the deepest human motive is the desire to be capable of love and justice,
which seems to me both true and original. Who would willingly or happily
say of himself that he was not capable of love or of justice? Yet love and jus-
tice are often not thought of as related, but in some sense opposed: love is
personal, nonjudgmental, an emotion; justice is impersonal, rational, driven
by standards and rules. Weil is saying not that these are the same thing, but
that they are compatible, and together the most important thing of all. Justice
without love would not be justice at all; and love without justice would be
false. The desire for love and justice is so deep that it makes us vulnerable,
and we tend to hide it behind other things-rationality or democratic theory
2. In French the sentence reads: II nest possible d'aimer et d'9tre juste que si Von connat
l'empire de la force et si 'on sait ne pas le respecter.
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or a view of life as choices or acts of consumption. But this phrase captures,
for me at least, much of what life is about at its center.
In addition, it is her idea, hinted at here but developed more fully in the
essay, that the empire of force is not simply a matter of brute power of a
military or economic kind but resides in the habits of mind and imagination
by which we dehumanize others or trivialize their experience, and this seems
to me exactly right. A system of brute power depends ultimately upon the
acceptance of a way of thinking about the world, and oneself within it, that
the actors in the system share, perhaps unconsciously. The members of a
secret police must share a loyalty to their leader or the organization will col-
lapse. For an example of another sort think of American racism, which
inhabits the mind of everyone raised in our culture and with which every
decent person must struggle.
Weil's sentence then tells us where we can start to understand and resist
the empire of force, which is with the way the it works in our own minds and
imaginations, leading us to objectify others and to disregard their reality. Our
double task is to understand this fact-to see as well as we can how we are
the captive of evil forces in our world-and to learn how "not to respect" the
empire, that is, how to resist it in our own thought and imagination and feel-
ing.
How does this relate to law and to the life of the lawyer? Directly, in my
view, for the meaning of law depends entirely upon the way in which it is
practiced, in the aims and understandings that move those who inhabit its
world. What we call law can on the one hand be a salient and powerful in-
strument of empire, denying humanity and trivializing human experience; or,
on the other, it can be an important way-perhaps our best way-of seeing,
recording, resisting empire. It depends entirely upon the way in which law is
done, upon the quality and direction of the lawyer's or judge's mind at work:
does it seek to understand the empire at force at work in the world and in the
self and learn how not to respect it? If so, and only if so, that mind, and the
law itself, may become capable of love and justice.
This sentence is the motto not only of my Montesquieu lecture, but of
my recent book, Living Speech: Resisting the Empire of Force, which devel-
ops at length the ideas I have just sketched out.
Does this also apply to your choice of Dickinson's "I like a look of ag-
ony,"3 or is there another perspective involved as well, given the fact that you
also spoke about Abraham Lincoln's speech at the end of the Civil War?
I include Dickinson's poem as an example of a text that shows the writer
understanding and not respecting the empire of force in one of its most im-
portant forms, namely deep sentimentality-which is simultaneously the
stock in trade of authoritarian political regimes and a vice against which the
3. Dickinson's poem reads: "I like a look of Agony, / Because I know it's true - / Men do
not sham Convulsion, / Nor simulate, a Throe - / The Eyes glaze once - and that is Death - /
Impossible to feign / The Beads upon the Forehead / By homely Anguish strung." Professor White
discussed this poem in Acts of Hope.
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poet must constantly struggle. In Dickinson's case, as a woman poet in nine-
teenth-century America, she was expected to write saccharine verse full of
false feeling, one object of which would be to maintain a reduced and senti-
mental image of the woman herself. In "I like a look of agony" Dickinson
confronts and resists those demands directly, insisting on the reality of her
own experience as one who grew up surrounded by false thought and false
speech. She reveals this directly in the biting next line,"Because it's true"-
unlike the rest of what she was offered by her world.
Dickinson represents for me a mind doing just what Weil recommends,
confronting the empire of force as it is at work in her culture and her own
mind, and showing us how not to respect it.
In his Second Inaugural Address Abraham Lincoln does much the same
thing in a very different context, as a political leader giving a speech near the
conclusion of a war, a speech that is meant to be the occasion for founding a
new community on the ruins that the war has left. Lincoln confronts the lan-
guage of empire in one of its most familiar forms, the language of war and
triumph, of hatred and dehumanization, and finds another way to imagine
the warring parties, in this case as equally culpable actors in a moral and
providential drama.
What does the title of your lecture refer to, then? I mean, given your
ideas on language, it would seem that it is not a matter of "meeting." Can
the one be at all without the other, in Cartesian fashion?
You are quite right to raise the question of the title, "When Language
Meets the Mind," which seems to assume that there is something called the
"mind" which exists unpolluted and pristine until it confronts this alien thing
called "language." Of course our minds are in large part shaped by our lan-
guages; this is in fact one way the empire works, taking over our
imaginations without our quite knowing it. So the task is much harder than
the title would imply: not how to defend yourself against an invasion that
takes place now, in your maturity; but how to deal with the fact that the hab-
its of mind and imagination I call the empire of force-those that
sentimentalize and falsify and dehumanize and trivialize-are already at
work in you and all of us. This is what must be understood; and it is this that
one must learn the art of not respecting. The title does not quite suggest this,
but I have not thought of a better way to put it.
One view I do want to resist is the idea that we are nothing but our lan-
guages or discourses, "sites" in which struggles take place between cultural
entities and forces over which we have no control. Our minds are not pris-
tine, not unpolluted, but at our very best we are able as writers to show that it
is possible to exert real control over what we say and who we are-as Homer
does, Dickinson does, and Weil does.
What does this mean for your views on judicial interpretation? The rea-
son I ask is that Justice Antonin Scalia's New Textualism has strong politico-
interpretive cards and it seems that Martin Garbus'prediction in Courting
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Disaster-"Time is on the side of the forces on the right. George W. Bush...
will probably appoint two or three justice to the Supreme Court. If he serves
two terms, he may appoint up to five, a Bush majority to go along with
Scalia and Thomas "-has come true. You have written, convincingly in my
opinion, about the role of the Supreme Court in your analysis of Casey in
your Acts of Hope when you say that the most notable aspect of the Joint
Opinion of Justices Kennedy, O'Connor and Souter is that it addresses the
citizens, to whom it explains the need to respect precedent. Moreover, it urges
them not to be swayed by political issues of the day in that the opinion specifi-
cally speaks to "those who themselves disapprove of the decision's results,
but who nevertheless struggle to accept them."
I think that the judicial opinion is a crucial forum for the issues I iden-
tify, for it can be either a central instrument of the empire of force, or, on the
other hand, a place where the writer shows that he or she understands the
empire and knows how not to respect it. As an example of the former, let me
point to Chief Justice Taft's opinion in Olmstead v. United States (the wire-
tapping case), which I discuss in Justice as Translation. This opinion is
conclusory in the extreme, never addressing the questions of meaning it is
necessarily resolving. It does this by claiming that the meaning of the rele-
vant provision, the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
(which prevents "unreasonable searches") is plain and obvious, when of
course it is highly arguable whether wiretapping should count as a search, as
Justice Brandeis makes clear in his rightly celebrated dissent. Taft's opinion
is mechanical and literal-minded, failing to think at all about the large ques-
tions the case presents-about the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, the
proper way to approach constitutional interpretation, the proper role of the
Court, and so on-all of which are matters Brandeis examines and reflects
upon with intelligence and good sense.
Such conclusory thinking and writing as Taft's, which hides the impor-
tant issues by pretending they are not there, is inherently authoritarian, a
refusal by the Court to discharge its obligation to subject its reasoning to the
judgment of its readers, ultimately the judgment of the people. Such an opin-
ion rests entirely upon the institutional authority of the Court. It is saying in
essence, "This is right because we say so." An opinion that by contrast re-
veals the reasons upon which it rests and acknowledges the force of
arguments the other way, exposing its own weakness as it were, can make a
claim to true authority, the kind of authority that rests not upon appointment
to an office but upon the earned respect of one's readers. Such an opinion is
saying, "This judgment is entitled to respect because you the reader can un-
derstand the premises and reasoning that support it. You can reject our
reasoning, and if you do this in enough of our cases you will reject our insti-
tutional authority as well."
The way I put this in Acts of Hope is still what I think: that when a judge
writes an opinion applying a law made by others-whether a statute, a con-
stitutional provision, or earlier judicial precedent-he or she has the
obligation not just to defer to that source of authority, a deference that could
Interview 1407May 2007]
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be asserted in a conclusory or empty or politically driven way, but to recon-
stitute it in his or her argument. Authority is not then simply claimed for a
text that is assumed to be problem-free, as Scalia often seems to proceed, but
for the text as it is read and recreated in the opinion itself; authority is thus
claimed not just for the prior text but for the mode of thought and imagina-
tion by which the Court reads and interprets it and in which the reader is able
to participate at second hand, as he reads the opinion, and at first hand too
when he criticizes it. In this sense authority is shared with the reader, which
is to say both the individual citizen and the larger public. It is this that makes
possible the true kind of authority that is earned by the mind that admits the
existence of difficulties, seeks to address them with humility and learning,
and shares with the reader these processes of thought. True authority is
earned, to use Weil's language, by an opinion that shows that it understands
the empire of force in all the many forms in which it tempts the Court-
including self-certainty, sentimentality, authoritarian and bullying modes of
thought, the denial of difficulty, the use of slogans and clichds, and so on-
and knows how not to respect them. It would not be too much to say at the
heart of a legal education should be the development of just these capaci-
ties-though perhaps all too often what we do seems to be the opposite.
In "Meaning What You Say," you mentioned approvingly the dissenting
opinion of Justice Jackson in Shaughnessy v. Mezel, "Fortunately it is still
startling, in this country, to find a person held indefinitely in executive cus-
tody without accusation of crime or judicial trial." It makes me think of what
happens today in Guantanamo Bay. What is your idea about the interrelation
of law and politics when it comes to issues like this?
This is a timely and important question. In my own mind, the very worst
thing my government has done in my lifetime is to repudiate as a matter of
principle its duty to treat the people it seizes or captures with fundamental
decency and respect. The administration has made clear over and over again
that it does not regard these people as human beings in any sense of the term,
but as objects to be brutalized and tortured, or simply erased and forgotten.
This is not a matter of a few rogue guards or interrogators, but of explicit
national policy. Those suspected of "terrorism" are said to be terrorists, with
no human rights at all.
In my view no one should ever be denied access to counsel or the right to
communicate with one's family, let alone subjected to the tortures of re-
peated near drownings, beatings, deafening music twenty-four hours a day
for weeks and months and years, freezing temperatures, threatened or actual
attacks by dogs, endless deprivation of sleep, sexual humiliation and degra-
dation, deprivation of the right to practice one's religion, not to mention
being shipped to secret prisons abroad or to "friendly" regimes for even
more hideous forms of torture. This is the empire of force in its most explicit
form, and I think it is a direct violation of the fundamental premises both of
our Constitution and of democracy itself. It is a rejection of the very idea of
law.
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What makes it even worse is that the torture has no legitimate security
goals. Experts are so far as I know in virtually unanimous agreement that
detainees can be made to talk with nothing like this treatment. To me this
means that the purpose of the notorious infliction of inhumane and degrad-
ing treatment is not to acquire information, as it is claimed, but rather to
demonstrate our own brutality and lawlessness, as a way of making anyone
who thinks of opposing us afraid to do so. We are not bound by principles of
law or decency, and make a parade of the fact. What this government is do-
ing is in fact a form of terrorism, in its essential structure like the murder of
innocent people by an occupying force simply to terrify the local inhabitants.
It is true that there are lawyers seeking to challenge these practices, both
in the United States and in Europe, and that some headway has been made
against them, even in the Supreme Court. But nothing has reached what oc-
curs in secret prisons abroad, and I think nothing can, except the exercise of
the power of the ballot box. While we have law, and legal institutions, we
have hope, but these are at present being deliberately perverted in a system-
atic way by the government. The outcome is still uncertain.
Can we then as legal professionals ever hope to achieve any form of jus-
tice if we have to accept that this can only be done in what you have called
the rhythms of hope and disappointment?
As you know, I talked originally (in From Expectation to Experience)
about the rhythms of hope and disappointment as they occur in the life of the
teacher, who always starts off a course full of hope for himself or herself,
and for the students too, but must then face the realties that disappoint these
hopes: the limitations of the students, of oneself, of the material. But you are
right to suggest that I think this to be a feature of human life more generally.
A kind of idealization of others and oneself is necessary to many kinds of
human activity, from marriage to teaching to psychotherapy to the practice
of medicine or law, even to reading a book. One is constantly allowing one-
self to hope for what cannot be; then experiencing disappointment; then, in a
healthy situation, allowing oneself a tempered satisfaction for what one has
achieved.
This is a fundamental rhythm of human activity and of course it occurs
in the law. As a good lawyer, one thinks that one's case is the most important
in the world, that what happens in it matters enormously; as a good judge
one wants to achieve perfect justice, perfectly explained and analyzed. Such
perfection is denied us, but that does not mean that the activity is not a good
one.
What you have called "reading by imaginary participation" in When
Words Lose Their Meaning and your attention to the singularity of the com-
munity of two between reader and text has brought you the critique of
advocating a purely New Critical interpretive position which is untenable for
law. In The Edge of Meaning you write that the main aim of the book is to
address the question whether we can find, or make, a way of imagining the
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self and the world and the others within it so that we can make possible co-
herent and valuable forms of speech and thought and action. On this view,
what are the ethical consequences, then, for legal professionals?
A couple of points just to clear the air. First, about New Criticism: this
mode of close reading is often attacked on the grounds that it is ahistorical
and apolitical. There may be instances of that kind of work, but the best
criticism of this kind is quite the opposite, deeply grounded in culture and
history and concerned, if not with politics with that upon which politics de-
pends, the way in which the human being and human life are imagined. (For
history I think of Rueben Brower's book about Pope's use of classical texts,
The Poetry of Allusion; for the image of the human being and human life I
think of Leavis's work on D.H. Lawrence.) The idea that New Critical read-
ing is radically decontextualized seems to me just wrong.
Second, while I grew up in the world in which people talked about New
Criticism, and my own work does involves close reading, I think of what I
do as having a deeply ethical and political purpose. The Legal Imagination is
in some sense all about the fundamental ethical challenges presented by a
commitment to legal thought and legal institutions; Justice as Translation
and Acts of Hope are both about the ethics and politics of judicial opinions;
The Edge of Meaning is about the activity of imagination by which we imag-
ine a shared world, the fundamental activity of political life.
Where I do continue to function out of New Critical premises is in my
insistence that the human self is not simply the product of cultural forces but
has the capacity to act upon, to use and to resist, the materials of meaning
that have helped to shape it.
For me, the very best work-like the Iliad say, or Jane Austen's novels-
has a direct ethical and political significance, for the relations that such texts
create with their readers have both political and ethical content, and can help
us understand possibilities for such relations in our own lives. Thus Austen's
Emma is about friendship simultaneously in its imagined world, where
Emma is such a bad friend to Harriet Smith and Miss Bates, and learns to be
a good friend, and in its relation to the reader, to whom Austen, through this
text, is a model of a certain kind of sympathetic and corrective friend. Like-
wise the Iliad creates a relation with its reader that can bring us to see and
criticize the essential inhumanity of the culture it represents. For the lawyer
or judge who reads either text well the experience should be one that ex-
pands and sharpens his sense of the political and ethical significance of what
he says and does, and thus hold out new possibilities by which he can shape
his own aspirations.
LIFE AND WORK...
Since the publication in 1973 of The Legal Imagination you have pas-
sionately proposed a view of law as a cultural practice, i.e., a humanist
approach. In retrospect, do you perceive any changes in legal education,
scholarship or practice?
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I meant in The Legal Imagination simply to make available in a new way
a necessary aspect of the practice of law, namely what might be called its
literary or creative aspect. The lawyer must after all speak an inherited lan-
guage of authority, and therefore has the task of coming to terms with its
constraints and limits, and also of seeing as fully as possible what can be
done with it. This is to think of the lawyer as writer or speaker, which he or
she surely is, and to suggest to the students that they need to focus their at-
tention in a fresh way both upon legal language and what can, by art and
invention, be done with it. This is turn is to raise the question of critical
judgment: what do you think of these constraints, these enablements? What
should be done with it, either in general, or in this particular case? All this
has an ethical element as well, for it is through imagining oneself as a writer
that I think the lawyer may come to understand his or her professional life in
a more satisfactory way, including its ethical dimension.
That is to put the matter abstractly. My idea was to bring the issues home
to the student through the kinds of questions I asked, and through the use of
examples from literature, history, philosophy, and ordinary life.
There was a sense in which this was a somewhat shocking and novel ap-
proach at the time. But this was an era in which law was taught and practiced
as an activity, as a set of things we do with language and ideas and each
other, and to that extent my book and course fit with more widely accepted
images of the law. (I think especially of Hart and Sacks, The Legal Process,
or Edward Levi, The Nature of Legal Reasoning). But since then I think it is
fair to say that many law teachers have become interested not so much in the
activity of law as in social policy, a sort of work that really has nothing to
say about law as a practice, which is what interests me. In this climate work
like mine has somewhat less natural resonance with legal culture, at least in
law schools, than it did thirty years ago.
What is your impression of the reception of Law and Literature in gen-
eral and your ideas in particular?
Despite what I have just said (or perhaps because of it) there is a real in-
terest in many American law schools in thinking about law in a humanistic
way. Someone put together a list of schools in which courses in law and lit-
erature or law and humanities were taught, and as I remember it was over
one hundred. There is an active organization, The Association for the Study
of Law, Literature, and the Humanities, which has a Journal (Law, Culture,
and Humanities) and an annual convention drawing a couple of hundred
people. Yale Law School has for several years had an excellent journal, The
Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities, and the California Press publishes
the well-established journal, Law and Literature. Another lively journal, the
Legal Studies Forum, is also centered on this field. Books come out every
year on law and literature, or law and film, or law and art. So a lot is happen-
ing. And to the credit of the movement, it does not have a single program or
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theory. Rather, the idea is that people should work out different questions
and methods for themselves, and let a thousand flowers bloom.
The Great Books, i.e., the literary canon of the Western world, are often
used in Law and Literature as examples to show how the ethical component
of law that traditional jurisprudence has left underexposed can and should
be revived. This usage of literature has met with a lot of critique, in that it
presupposes an education in the classical cultural tradition which many
people lack today, or that it accepts unquestioningly the social order de-
scribed in these books. You also offer many examples from the canon to your
reader What do you think of the argument that in our present-day multicul-
tural societies the idea of the canon runs into trouble?
I have heard this objection a lot and thought about it. I think there is not
much in it, frankly, because it is based on the idea that the works of the
canon in some blind way accept the social and cultural order in which they
are produced. There may be examples of this, but certainly the texts that I
have devoted the most attention to-Homer, and Plato, and Dante, and
Shakespeare, and Thoreau, and Austen, and Twain, for example-are deeply
critical of their cultures; indeed theirs is often the most telling and profound
criticism of all. In fact, as I have suggested above, what we have most to
learn from them is the intellectual and imaginative process by which they
criticize their culture, so that we in our context can do likewise.
I am simply not impressed by an argument, say, that Jane Austen has
nothing to say to an era in which same-sex unions are regarded as legitimate
simply because in her world they were not, or that Plato has nothing to teach
us, as egalitarians, because he is a member of an elite upper class. It is of
course true that texts in the canon have sometimes been taught or written
about in empty or authoritarian or sentimental ways, but the texts themselves
are not responsible for such abusive readings.
I have one more remark. In response to your question I have been using
the standard phrase "the canon," but I do want to cast some doubt on it, at
least as applied to my work. I have not worked with the texts I have chosen
because they were in something called the canon, or because other people
thought they were valuable; I have worked with them because I found them
deeply educative and rewarding and thought that they spoke both to me and
my profession and my time in a useful way. Of course I could be wrong, but
that is the principle of my selection. My feeling is that if my judgment has
concurred with others over time, so much the better.
This is not to say that there are not other texts, in other languages and
cultures, that would be equally valuable. Of course there may be. My own
choices reflect my education, but I think that is inevitable.
And, on this view, what do you think of the claim defended as passion-
ately by some, for example by Martha Nussbaum, as it is attacked by others
that literature when incorporated in the professional lives of lawyers can
make not only valuable ethical but also social contributions?
1412 [Vol. 105:1403
Of course I think it can make valuable social contributions. The question
is exactly how this might Work, and in my view that depends upon the mind
and character of the reader. Obviously I do not think that reading Sophocles,
for example, will automatically make you good or wise; that depends on how
you read it, and if you read in a stupid and unreflective way, looking for
cliches or slogans or confirmations of your prejudices, or read it as an item
of high consumption, like fine wines or elegant wallpaper, it will do nothing
for you at all. But I think Sophocles and Plato and Homer and Swift and
Jane Austen have a great deal to teach us, especially about the nature of
thought and language and the practice of cultural criticism, which would, in
a person who read them well, greatly increase their power and their wisdom.
In your article "Legal Knowledge" you write, "I want to begin by say-
ing: law is not a body of knowledge that can be reduced to propositions or
rules; its primary object is not truth, as if it were a kind of science, but jus-
tice." It would seem that you take a firm stand here against the Langdellian
idea of law as science. But what, then, is 'justice"? I am asking you this
specifically because you claim the image of knowledge as purely objective or
wholly shareable is wrong for law, and perhaps all other fields, in that where
language is required to communicate there is always a gap that can never be
wholly bridged because language and translation are imperfect.
I cannot of course define justice in a couple of paragraphs! But perhaps I
can say something about what I meant-in that essay. I was responding in my
mind to a friend, an art historian and psychologist, who asked me where
truth was in the law, truth being for him the central intellectual value. Of
course truth matters in the law, enormously-that is why we have trials-but
the goal of the enterprise is not to establish the truth of a set of propositions
but to do justice. And justice is above all relational: establishing the right
relation between the parties to litigation or a contract, between the courts and
the legislature, between the people and the legislature, and so on. But what is
the right relation? All of law in a sense is directed to this question, and no
single formulation in any part of it can fully answer the question. This is
partly because language is inherently ambiguous, or subject to multiple in-
terpretations, partly because no one can decide such questions in the
abstract, as legislatures are required to do; the result is that in every case
there is in the end an act of judgment, by the judge, or by the lawyers, or
both, which itself cannot be perfectly expressed, so as to serve for example
as a perfect and nonproblematic precedent for others.
INTERDISCIPLINARITY IN LAW
Let's return to your argument about language, but a bit differently. You
have consistently argued that law as a culture of argument addresses ques-
tions of value and community. You speak in When Words Lose Their
Meaning of a politics of persuasion to claim meaning, one that is present
whenever there is a conflict between forms of discourse and/or concepts. I
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would say the same goes when we deal with epistemological and methodo-
logical questions of interdisciplinary work, and it touches issues of the
interrelations between interdisciplinary fields. In the chapter entitled "The
Language and Culture of Economics" in Justice as Translation you compare
the languages of law and economics and find in the economic thought domi-
nant in the Chicago School of Law and Economics the Hobbesian vice of
calculability and governability of human life associated with the idea of neu-
trality of language and concepts.
In Acts of Hope, however, you took your argument one step further and
considered the possibility that some languages may never be translated suc-
cessfully, thus adding an element of limitation to the original concept of
translation and accepting the possibility of non-translatability of discourses,
of intransigent positions. Does this mean you have changed your views on
Law and Economics too? And with translation and integration as the keys to
the model of interdisciplinary scholarship that you espouse, what does all
this mean for law? I mean, lawyers also show the vice of linguistic imperial-
ism when it comes to the language of legal concepts. What do you think of
the way Posner set the tone when he divorced law from legal theory: "Law is
subject matter rather than technique. Legal analysis is the application to the
law of analytic methods that have their source elsewhere"? Can such a di-
chotomy be made?
Let me try to respond to all these questions at once, if I may. I do think
that languages and the practices they entail mark out distinct domains, and
that translation between them is always imperfect. To think of economics
and law from this point of view, I would say that these are radically different
enterprises that work on different premises and by different methods. One
cannot do economics in the language of law, nor can one do law in the lan-
guage of economics.
Think for a moment of the fundamental activity of the lawyer or judge
faced with a case or question in the world. It is to seek to resolve it by turn-
ing in the first instance to judgments of others-expressed in statutes or
constitutional provisions or regulations or earlier decisions by courts-that
claim to speak with authority to the matter at hand. The lawyer or judge must
think about which of these texts is entitled to deference, and if so how much,
and also what the text should be said to mean in this new context. All of
these judgments should be reasoned out, and one can expect them to be con-
tested. As I argued in Justice as Translation, the last judgment, about what
the text means in this new context, is itself a species of translation, requiring
the exercise of a most difficult and challenging art. And this whole legal en-
terprise has as its goal the definition and achievement of justice.
The economist, functioning as such, cannot do any of these things. His
or her question has to do with which rule or outcome is more efficient, for
that, not justice, is the issue to which economic analysis is directed. Eco-
nomics has no way to respect judgments made by legislatures or courts or
private parties, no way to engage in the art of deference which is essential to
what we mean by the rule of law. Economics can compare what it describes
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as different legal regimes, but only on the assumption, which no lawyer
would make, that the process by which rules are interpreted and applied is
nonproblematic, in fact automatic. That process is the heart of the life of
judge and lawyer, and it calls upon the widest range of intellectual and ethi-
cal capacities.
I do not mean that the law has nothing to learn from economics, for of
course it has, whenever it faces a question within the expertise of econom-
ics-about monopolization, for example, under the antitrust laws. But
economics can never answer the legal question, which has to do with the
meaning of particular legal texts, read independently and in light both of
each other and of the larger culture of which they are a part.
Law is inherently interdisciplinary for it must always be open to learning
what it can from other fields, from history to accounting, from physics to
engineering to linguistics, from sociology to psychology. In fact there is in
principle no limit on the fields that may be relevant to a legal case, fields on
which experts may testify and which the lawyers may have to explain to the
judges, the judges to the jurors. Anything may turn out to be relevant to the
legal dispute, and have something to teach the law.
But on the ultimate legal questions, namely the interpretation of authori-
tative legal documents, their translation into jury instructions, and the
composition of briefs and opinions putting those texts together in new con-
texts, no other field can properly preempt the law, for the distinctive
responsibility of the law is the identification and interpretation of those au-
thoritative texts in new compositions of its own. The image of translation
captures what law does here rather well I think, for it is simultaneously re-
specting sources of knowledge external to itself (the analogue to the text in a
foreign language that the translator is trying to get across) and insisting, as a
translator necessarily does, on the value of its own language and its prem-
ises.
It is also crucial that the authority of the authoritative texts to which the
law defers is ultimately based upon democratic processes. The words of the
legislature or the Constitution have authority because they are the words of
the people's representatives. Earlier judicial precedent has authority because
the courts that decided the cases had the right and duty under the relevant
statutes and constitutions to do so. And taken as a whole, the cases and prin-
ciples of law have the authority of the past, acquiesced in over time, and the
authority of the kind of reason that seeks to render that past simultaneously
coherent and just.
Law and Economics works very differently. Instead of seeking to learn
from a wide range of fields, as law does, most Law and Economics assumes
that economics can be used as the sole basis for the determination of a legal
rule or result. It seems to have nothing to learn from history or philosophy or
sociology or anthropology or linguistics or engineering or physics or any
other field. Instead of being a center of translation, with all the difficulty and
interest that suggests, Law and Economics typically denies that any transla-
tion is necessary or that any other field has anything to teach it or the law.
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This means that Law and Economics is not only unable to think about
what interests me, namely what lawyers and judges actually do with the ma-
terials of authority that define their task, but is also handicapped in its
chosen field, that of policy, for it does not, so far as I know, engage in the
kind of translation that is essential to the integration of diverse and conflict-
ing sources of understanding, but seeks to reduce all thought to a single
system.
The result-unlike the law-is in effect antidemocratic, for in place of
the law's authority, which rests on acts of democratically responsible agen-
cies, economics proposes a theory, which has no democratic legitimacy
beyond its presumed self-evidence.
The idea of Law and Economics then, as I understand it, is not the sensi-
ble view that economics should inform the law when the analysis of
economic questions becomes relevant to a case, but that it should in effect
replace the law, and legal thought, substituting for the law's system of de-
mocratic, historical, and cultural authority, maintained by legal reason,
another system, which does not have the characteristics and virtues essential
to what we mean by law.
Finally, and very briefly, what I call the theory of economics is some-
times used as a political theory, not an economic one, which applies the
assumptions of a certain kind of economics to the full range of human life,
not just to economic transactions. These assumptions include some that are
demonstrably false, for example that the world is made up of actors who are
mature and competent and able to act rationally in their own self interest,
and some that are ethically and politically offensive, for example that all
human action should be regarded as self-interested. In addition, the effect of
a systematic belief in the market is often to affirm an existing allocation of
wealth and power, or to modify existing arrangements in the interests of the
rich, who are of course able to function in the competitive way assumed by
economics far more successfully than the poor.
So to return to your questions, I have not changed my view of Law and
Economics, but continue to regard it as a threat to the idea of law itself (at
least in law schools) and to the law's democratic authority. Of course there
are economic questions of great importance on which economists have much
to say. Law has much to learn from economics in such instances. But in my
view it must always be the law that decides legal questions, and it must do so
using legal materials and legal methods of thought. The effort to supplant
law by a certain kind of economics is an effort to destroy the fabric of legal
thinking.
So you can see why I would say that nothing could be further from the
truth than Judge Posner's statement that "legal analysis is the application to
the law of analytic methods that have their origin elsewhere." For me, legal
analysis is the practice of specifically legal modes of thought and judgment,
and I think that it is both an intellectual folly and political disaster to attempt
to supplant these with modes of thought that cannot possibly do what the law
does at the center, namely to respect and seek to interpret the judgments of
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others. If "legal analysis" is what Judge Posner claims it to be, it is not the
law, but something else and not entitled to be treated or taught as law.
To return, if only briefly, to your choice of texts, why did you choose
Plato's Phaedrus as the center of The Edge of Meaning?
I should start with a little background. Each of my principal books fo-
cuses on a particular activity of mind and language: in The Legal
Imagination it is the activity of learning to speak and think like a lawyer; in
When Words Lose Their Meaning it is the compositional activity in which we
engage when we work with the language of our culture, laden as it is with
value and presupposition, to try to create meanings of our own and to estab-
lish constructive relations with other people too; in Justice as Translation it
is the activity of translation, of which interpretation is an important form,
especially the kind of interpretation represented in the judicial opinion; in
Acts of Hope it is the activity of claiming external authority for one's judg-
ments, in the law and elsewhere, an activity by which one reconstitutes the
source of authority in one's writing; in "This Book of Starres": Learning to
Read George Herbert, it is the activity of learning the language of another
mind, in this case that of the poet Herbert; in The Edge of Meaning it is the
activity in which we seek to imagine the world, and ourselves and others
within it, in such a way as to permit us to claim meaning for our experience;
in Living Speech it is the activity of struggling to understand the empire of
force, in the world and in ourselves, and to learn how to stop respecting it.
In each case I compare the way the activity in question works in the law
and in other fields of life and thought, including philosophy and history and
literature, and also in our ordinary experience. In each case I regard the ac-
tivity as simultaneously intellectual and ethical, a work of the mind and
imagination but also one for which we are responsible as ethical actors. And
in each case I regard the relation of the mind to language as problematic,
seeing language as both a friend and enemy, giving us enormous capacities
for thought and life but also restraining and sometimes misleading us. So a
constant question is: How is one to manage the relation with the language
one is given by one's culture to use? This of course is the theme of the Mon-
tesquieu Lecture as well.
The Phaedrus seemed perfect from this point of view. It is written in
Greek, a problematic language for me and my reader, for it is foreign to all
of us, and problematic for Plato, who is constantly trying to find ways to
puts its commitments and implications into question. The dialogue is about
the possibility of meaning in the largest sense: how are to imagine our
selves, or what he calls our souls? What are we to think of our capacity for
love, or in another mood, of our susceptibility to it? What is the proper rela-
tion between this, the deepest of human feelings and the life of the mind?
What are the strengths and dangers of different forms of composition-
stagey and paradoxical argument, Socratic conversation, literary criticism,
and the creation of myth?
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Plato for me is a model of excellence in the way he addresses all these
questions, never resting upon the assertion of propositions but always engag-
ing the reader in the activity of thought he recommends, teaching us not just
by example but by our own experience.
Finally, at the time I wrote the book the focus on love seemed to me cru-
cial, though I could not quite say why; but my work since that time with the
sentence from Simone Weil that connects love and justice as the two central
values of human life has simply confirmed that judgment.
CONCLUSION
In talking about the law, in this interview and elsewhere, I mean to speak
not so much from the outside, as say a political scientist might, but from the
inside, as a lawyer. I am not sure that I could devise a general definition of
the social phenomenon of law-in fact I rather think I could not-but I do
know what it is to teach law, and to learn it, and what I mean by the word
law is mainly what we teach: a complex inherited language of analysis and
argument, which has its origins outside of any of us, and a set of intellectual
and social practices, again complex, by which that language can be put to
use in the world-practices that can be done well or badly, with conse-
quences, small and great. This language is not a product merely of the
culture but also of our political process, and, unlike the theories of profes-
sors-including my own-it is ultimately based upon the authority of
democracy.
I am confident that at its best the law we learn and teach is an immensely
significant resource both for our society and culture generally, and for those
of us lucky enough to live on its terms. It offers a way of approaching a real
world problem in terms established by others who have faced similar prob-
lems in the past and expressed their views in the authoritative texts of the
law, from statutes and regulations to constitutions and judicial opinions. In
this sense, it is a way of benefiting from the experience of the past.
But to say that we use a language made by others is not to say that we
are governed by a dead hand: as every law student learns, one finds in a very
wide range of cases indeed, that arguments-rational, persuasive, decent
arguments-can be made on both sides of the question. The law thus re-
quires real choices from both judges and lawyers, but it informs those
choices, which should not be merely a matter of preference or calculation,
but should rather express the result of the mind's engagement with the mate-
rials of the law-an engagement that holds out the promise, sometimes
realized, of a real education for the lawyer, the judge, and the world.
The law in this way creates the space and opportunity for its own change.
At its best it makes its changes in response to real conditions and real needs.
It is not a model of abstract reasoning, not a theory or an ideology, but a way
of living responsibly in the world. It does not collapse into untutored choice,
or simple analysis of the costs and benefits one happens to perceive, for it is
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animated by the fact that its actors are responsible for what they do and must
justify their discharge of those responsibilities in the language of the law
itself.
These practices have at their center a perhaps somewhat surprising ideal-
ism: the statutes and judicial opinions that bear on a case are not read
cynically, or reduced to the motives presumed to underlie them, but read as if
they were composed by an ideal legislator, an ideal judge, someone who is
saying what he means and meaning what he says. The judge is addressed, in
the courtroom and in briefs alike, as if he or she were an ideal judge, and the
lawyers too are spoken of with respect, as honorable advocates. This ideali-
zation is, of course, in some sense a fiction: neither judge nor lawyer nor
legislator is always wise, always honest, always responsible, and sometimes
they are the opposite of these things. But it is a positive fiction, creating a
pressure on all parties to become and act better than they might otherwise.
There is another kind of idealism in the law, crucial both to its methods
of change and to its meaning, that resides in the virtually universal but little
noted convention that the lawyer and judge alike must credibly claim that the
outcome for which they argue, or which they reach, is not only called for by
the legal texts in question, but is in an important sense itself just. To say that
the law requires an outcome, while admitting that it is unjust, or to claim that
justice requires an outcome, while admitting that the law does not permit it,
is to make a fatally incomplete and defective argument. The simultaneous
insistence upon law and justice produces a constant pressure to think and
rethink both what justice is and what the law requires. It is an engine for
opening the law to our deepest values.
I have spoken here of the law at its best. Of course it is often corrupted,
like any social and cultural form. Sometimes it is very bad: unthinking, con-
clusory, authoritarian, sentimental, erasing the experience of others, bullying,
inhuman, not connected in any good way with either reality or justice. But it
always has within it the seeds of its own excellence, and to spend a life
thinking, as lawyer and teacher, about what these excellences are, and what
they might be, has been for me an extraordinary pleasure and privilege.
-James Boyd White, March 2007.
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